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16 March 2000

Introduction

In this discussion, I want to focus specifically on the complexity of conflicts in Africa and the challenges and dilemmas of peacebuilding, for a number of reasons. First, I think peace and security must fundamentally be about improving people's quality of life and relationships. For this to happen, Africa needs a proactive pursuit of peace and security that must consist in putting in place structures, processes and institutions that could forestall the deterioration of tensions and conflicts into armed conflict. Secondly, I think addressing the roots of conflicts in Africa is really addressing such important and fundamental issues as economic development, human rights and democracy, environmental degradation, etc. Thirdly, the nature of conflict-related emergencies, the multiplicity of their consequences, their persistence long after the conflict is terminated and the absence of tried and tested approaches in dealing with them, make conflicts a central concern in the continent. Fourthly, (which could very well be the first) my focus is influenced by my work in the field of peacebuilding and conflict transformation for the last nearly 10 years. This work has involved mostly grassroots peacebuilding and reconciliation work in diverse places in the continent. As a result, my reflections are more from the perspective of a practitioner than academic

There is more or less a consensus with regard to the limitations of the traditional narrow military-and-external-threat understanding of peace and security. The "national security" doctrine especially during the cold war era focused on how a nation protects its "core national values" and "interests" against external threat through the use of military force or threat of it. In the developing world, and certainly in Africa, the doctrine was much more that of "state security" where the focus was not so much the security of the nation and its interests as that of the ruling elite--perceived to be the link that symbolized and held the new and fragile nation-states together. This approach was aided by ruthless state apparatus, which in turn enjoyed the support of super powers in the cold war arithmetic and was based on the assumption that African countries needed strong centralized rule in order to survive. Unlucky countries like Angola and Mozambique had the super powers support different elite camps in the countries to wage some of the longest and disastrous civil wars in the continent. Support by super powers encouraged regimes to disregard internal tension-generating realities that today should be the central concern of peace and security in African countries. These include, but are not limited to, the fragility of the African nation-states and their economies, chronic poverty, marginalization and exclusion from the political process, inequitable distribution of resources, etc., all of which are at the core of social justice. These tensions are exacerbated when interested parties organize around ethnic (or clan), racial, religious, linguistic and other differences to stake their claims. The result has been violent conflicts in one African country after another. Ironically, the very people that yearn for social justice end up hopelessly divided and at war with each other.

Africa's conflicts have exerted such heavy tolls on the people and their cultures, economies, infrastructure and environment, that it is a wonder how some have survived. Everywhere there are tales of heart-wrenching experiences in situations of conflict. Millions of deaths, displacement of people, psychological scars, starvation, destruction of community bonds, environmental degradation, proliferation of weapons mostly in the hands of non-state actors, are some of the consequences of the conflicts.

More often than not, a conflict in one country has tended to trigger off other conflicts or insecurity in a region, thus making it difficult to distinguish between intra- and inter-national conflicts. Regionalization of conflicts happens through movements of refugees, fighters and arms. Political activity among refugees becomes a major source of conflict as evidenced in the Great Lakes region of central Africa, as do ethnic and cultural affinities along borders. These problems are heightened by perceptions of direct or indirect encouragement of political activity by host countries. In the Great Lakes region, it is clear that one episode of a conflict creates the conditions for the next one. For example, in 1990 Rwandans exiled in Uganda in the 50s launched their comeback from Uganda. After the genocide in 1994, other Rwandans found refuge in eastern DRC. The current involvement of Rwanda in the DRC war is excused by Rwandas need to neutralize politically active Rwandan refugees who might in their turn want to stage an armed comeback.

Due to the regionalization (and, ultimately, internationalization) of Africa's conflicts, it is now commonly accepted wisdom that one cannot address conflict issues in just one country and not pay attention to the regional and international dimensions. Thus, solutions to the conflict in the DRC cannot be sought without paying attention to the conflicts in the neighbouring countries of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The war in Sierra Leone was intimately connected with events in Liberia. Similarly, Kenyas increased insecurity in the urban areas and apparent arms race among its pastoral communities in the north is best viewed in the context of long periods of war and insecurity in the region, especially in Somalia and Sudan and the subsequent movement of people and arms into Kenya.

In itself, the proliferation of arms in the continent is of important significance to peace and security. As states engage in wars or fight rebels, keeping track of arms (especially those defined as "light" or "small" arms) becomes very difficult as control regimes collapse. Arms that are today in legal (government) hands easily become the illicit ones in tomorrow's wars, car-jacking and bank robberies. As already mentioned, ordinary herders in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan are armed with sophisticated weapons, ostensibly for protection of their herds. In reality, these weapons have been a major source of insecurity in the area as they are used in raids and counter raids within and across national borders that the governments in the region might not be able to control save by deploying their combined militaries along the borders. For Kenya, the entire northern belt is a security nightmare.

A number of Africa's major conflicts have been funded through illegal trade in some of the natural resources. Thus, in the DRC, in Sierra Leone and in Angola, diamond and gold mines, oil fields and even forests are always a major prize for any side of the conflict. With all its diamonds and oil and relatively small population, Angola ought to be one of the richest countries in Africa. Mineral wealth is often both the reason and the means for some of the long-running conflicts. Fighters on all sides benefit from the mineral wealth while arms merchants are only too happy to keep the fighters supplied for a cut of the mineral wealth. In spite of the UN ban on unofficial diamond sales these still find their way to Western capitals.

A worrying trend in Africa that is gaining roots is the privatization of security. In its more universal sense, this takes the form of mercenaries who wage wars on behalf of both internal and external actors in African conflicts. Its more localized version is the "hired thugs" who are used by political actors to visit violence on opponents. Urban insecurity has also been in the increase, leaving citizens to devise "self-help" security arrangements as the police can no longer cope. The rise in urban insecurity has been connected to the general deterioration of economies, thus forcing people (mostly gangs of educated but unemployed youth) into violent and daring crime. In Nairobi, for instance, well organized crime syndicates rival and often outdo the police in their sophistication. Indeed, Africa's unemployed and increasingly restless youth pose a major security concern.

But it is not all gloom and doom. There are some positive developments in Africa that need to be recognized and encouraged. Continental and regional groupings are increasingly involved in responding to conflict issues within and among their member states. From the OAU to IGAD to ECOWAS to SADC, conflict management and peacemaking have become a central agenda. This is an indication that the continents' institutions are beginning to rise to the challenge of conflicts. However, it would be interesting if these regional bodies could facilitate processes where more than just the armed parties in the conflict come to the negotiating table. In cases like Sudan, Burundi, DRC and others, attempts should be made to listen keenly to the people on whose behalf the wars are purportedly being fought, a move that could only enhance the chances of implementation of any agreements. This could be a major innovation to African peacemaking. At another level, Ecumenical organizations such as the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC who, together with the World Council of Churches, were instrumental in the negotiations and signing of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement between the government of Sudan and southern rebels) have also been closely involved in peacebuilding work in a number of settings, working through the faith communities. Cutting across the levels, but concentrated mostly at the micro level, are a host of NGOs and other civil society organizations that have sprung up in the continent in the last decade. All these are indications that people are willing to claim security as a concern not to be left only in the hands of the state. In any case, the state has often been the main violator of peoples security by either commission or ommission.

Africa's leadership must bear responsibility for peace and security or its absence in their countries. There has been a tendency (mostly Western media-driven) to assess the performance of Africa's leadership in relative terms of how better than their predecessors or neighbours they have done. From this perspective, President Moi of Kenya is judged at how well he has kept his country strife-free as compared to neighbouring Sudan or Somalia, while President Museveni of Uganda is judged by how well he has kept Uganda together as compared to regimes before his. Not too long ago, the leadership in Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia was hailed as new-breed and visionary, a harbinger of better things to come from Africa. Several years later, there is no immediate evidence of any innovation on their part that could provide long-term solutions to the problems of the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions; on the contrary, the regions' stability seems to have deteriorated and become more militarized. More objective criteria (for example how well the leaders nurture institutions that ensure stability, social justice and national cohesion in the long term) need to be encouraged. Peace and security would better be served if African countries spent less on armament and war preparedness and more on socio-economic development.

Lastly, some observations on the challenge of healing and reconstruction:

Reconstruction after conflict is often understood in the limited sense of rehabilitating physical amenities and infrastructure destroyed in the conflict. Indeed, this is very important as destruction of infrastructure and other strategic installations forms a central part of any war campaign. But reconstruction after conflict should be approached differently than if one were dealing with consequences of a natural disaster, paying equal attention to the human dimension of our conflicts (or reconciliation if you will.) While natural disasters can bring even sworn enemies together, united in grief and compassion, conflicts tear people apart and destroy bonds, leaving deep psychological scars. Most of Africa's conflicts have been marked by very high civilian death tolls and some of the vilest atrocities imaginable. From Liberia to Mozambique, Sudan to Angola, Rwanda to Somalia to Sierra Leone, the conflicts leave indelible marks in the collective memories of the people. In some countries, generations of young people have grown up knowing only war. In Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Sudan children have been both direct targets of violence as well as participants in it. Many have watched as their parents, friends and relatives were killed and dismembered, or participated in these acts. There are thousands of women traumatized by wars. We therefore have war-scarred generations across the continent who must somehow fit in the reconstruction equation lest their experiences become the breeding ground for future atrocities.

With the exception of cases like South Africa, the important work of healing of memories and closure after protracted conflicts has been seen as incidental to the building of a sound, developing country and rarely features in peace agreements intended to end the conflicts. In many instances, healing work has been left to non-official actors such as churches and NGOs whose relationship to the state is often one of mutual suspicion than one of partnership. Some of these actors are well intentioned and doing remarkable work while others are simply opportunistic. We suggest that rebuilding of human relationships after conflict must be a central and deliberate process recognized as such by authorities. In this regard, South Africa's TRC must be looked to as an example of an attempt to bring closure to an atrocious past so as to create the possibility for a prosperous common future. Neither the offering of blanket amnesty (as in the recent case of Sierra Leone), nor the pursuit of a strictly judicial process (as in the case of Rwanda) may guarantee the kind of peaceable future that is desired.

Rwanda is a very sensitive case and one risks being branded insensitive for suggesting certain things. There is no doubt that, emerging as it is from the atrocious war of 1994, a process of accountability for the deaths is needed. Rwanda also needs to be assured of its security from possible attacks from the remnants of the former army. However, these two measures can only be for the short term. The long-term solution for Rwanda's security lies in its leadership's courage to face up to the healing of the age-old conflict between its two main ethnic groups and working for meaningful co-existence between them. History especially places on the current leadership an onerous task. Reconciliation constantly demands more of the "victim" than of the "perpetrator"; more so if, ironically as in the case of Rwanda, the victim is also the victor! And this is not just an idle suggestion. Knowing the sheer number of people killed in the Rwandan genocide and the atrocities involved in this and the Sierra Leonian war, who dares to tell the victims to reconcile? And yet, who dares to tell them there is any other way forward? Repeatedly in Africa's conflicts, there are no victims and perpetrators, only victims. Especially where the violence seeps downwards and infects not a few hundred people but entire communities, then we have to sharpen our tools for finding solutions. To refuse to face up to these questions is to condemn our countries to endless cycles of pogroms. South Africa, though not necessarily perfect and of a different history, is one example where the victim turned victor has shown tremendous magnanimity toward the former aggressor as a way of fostering national reconciliation, even in the absence of any significant reciprocation from the latter. We have to start somewhere to break the cycles of violence that are stifling our countries.

Conclusion

Africa's peace and security lies not necessarily in elaborate war preparation and policing, but more in working systematically to address tension-generating issues that breed violent conflicts. These issues have to do with responsive, inclusive and accountable governance, respect for people's rights, sound management and stewardship of resources, expansion of economic opportunities, etc. Working at these issues is the best preventive action. Similarly, more attention needs to be accorded to healing and reconciliation work so as to break cycles of violence that characterize Africa's conflicts. It is emphasized here that reconciliation does not mean a simple "forgive and forget" approach, but a more systematic process of healing memories akin to the South African TRC.

All these, of course are long-term processes requiring action at different levels, by different actors (internal and external), and persistently over a period of time. Had we started on, and sustained, these processes at independence, our stories would probably be different.

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