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Africa Action Talking Points on U.S.-Sudan Policy

August 2, 2009


August 2009




Four million internally displaced people. According to UN figures, nearly 300,000 dead. While the serious massacres of 2003-2004 are no longer commonplace, millions of people today remain affected by the conflict in Darfur. The Sudanese government deliberately restricts humanitarian access to these victims. Military aircraft continue to bomb rebel controlled areas where civilians reside. Over the past year, government forces have tried numerous times to forcibly evict civilians from some of Darfur’s biggest camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). Civilians, particularly women, work hard to live with dignity in the sprawling urban communities that IDP camps have become, but a climate of lawlessness, violence (including rape) and impunity for human rights abusers persists. The conflict has brought instability to neighboring countries as well, notably to eastern Chad and the Central African Republic.

Darfur has not burned for six years because of a lack of global attention. On the contrary, the international community has mounted the world’s largest humanitarian aid operation there; yet it has been unable to address the root causes of conflict and poverty.

The United Nations Security Council has twice authorized UN-led peacekeeping missions for Darfur. Yet these forces have been unable to effectively fulfill their mandate of protection. The mission has yet to place its entire authorized force on the ground in Sudan, instead subsisting on fewer personnel.

The massive and well-intentioned international response to the genocide in Darfur has been tragically ineffective for two main reasons. First, because of lack of political will, the international community has failed to follow through on its promises and back up its commitments with real action. Second, the U.S. and other external actors have approached Sudan’s conflicts in isolation from one another. U.S. and European diplomats worked tirelessly to help broker the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan’s decades-long North-South civil war, while ignoring massive atrocities unfolding in Darfur. As grassroots activists forced policymakers to focus their attention on Darfur, the international community essentially forgot about the CPA, and tensions between the North and South have escalated over the past year and pushed the treaty to the brink of collapse.

Despite the US’ inability to garner a stronger international response, Qatar has taken upon itself to foster what has come to be known as the Qatari Initiative. By organizing talks between rebel groups and the Sudanese government with hopes of securing peace in the region, this initiative has recently been successful in brokering a peace agreement the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese government.

However, this new administration offers an opportunity for a new and more effective U.S.-Sudan policy. This Africa Action resource outlines a plan of action for the president to break from the failures of the past and achieve peace, human security and justice for the people of Darfur and all Sudan.

The Prioritization of Human Rights over Counterintelligence Considerations:
This new administration must prioritize human rights abroad and make human rights, not the so-called “war on terror,” the unambiguous top priority in U.S.-Sudan relations. Bilateral and U.S.-led multilateral diplomatic pressure has little credible effect when Sudanese officials know that despite whatever State Department officials say, U.S. intelligence agencies will continue to coddle them. As negotiators struggle to build leverage against Khartoum, U.S. diplomats are undercut by senior national security officials eager to maintain friendly intelligence sharing relations with the regime. This two-faced policy is outrageous, unacceptable and should be reformed immediately.

The All-Sudan Strategy:
Rather than treating each of Sudan’s conflicts in isolation, the U.S. must pursue an all-Sudan strategy where both Darfur and the CPA are top priorities. A return to war between North and South Sudan would be a humanitarian disaster in and of itself and would doom hopes of peace and security in Darfur. National elections are scheduled for February 2010. Serious challenges emerged while conducting the national census in 2008 that will affect the fair representation of the citizens of Darfur and South Sudan in these polls. Adherence to the timeline laid out in the CPA is of particular importance to Southerners because of the 2011 referendum on whether South Sudan will remain part of the country or secede as an independent nation.

The U.S should do what it can in the short timeframe before polls open to promote elections that are as free and fair as possible while vigorously preparing for contingencies around different possible scenarios in what is looks certain to be highly contested elections. U.S. development assistance should prioritize widespread social and economic development programs such as healthcare, education and food security across Southern Sudan, rather than military assistance. Violence and instability are less likely to erupt around flawed or contested elections if Southerners feel they are experiencing “peace dividends” – tangible economic and social benefits linked to the CPA. The U.S. should make it a priority to jumpstart political negotiations between Darfuri rebels, the government and civil society leaders. In particular, representatives for the displaced, refugees, Darfuris, women, communities, religious leaders, elders, rebel leaders and governmental actors must all be represented. The chance of full inclusion of all relevant parties in the upcoming election is unlikely; however, the U.S. can help Darfuris gain an expanded voice in their governance structures.

The U.S. participated in a conference in June 2009, along with over 20 other countries and organizations, including the National Congress Party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in order to discuss the implementation of the CPA. These open and inclusive discussions can be the foundation for a sustainable and equitable peace, especially if the U.S. fully supports them.

The U.S. must provide the political, financial and logistical support of regional and international structures that could help to fulfill the needs for peace and justice. UNAMID has been crippled by lack of international support and obstruction by the government of Sudan. Currently, UNAMID has 16,402 troops on the ground, despite having an authorized strength of 19,555 troops. The U.S. can support free and fair elections in Sudan by way of support to the UNAMID.

In addition to the UNAMID force in Darfur, the U.S. should focus on improving the effectiveness of the separate UN peacekeeping operation in Southern Sudan known as UNMIS. UNMIS failed miserably in protecting civilians along the border region of Abyei when violence displaced some 50,000 people there in May 2008. The U.S. should work diplomatically and logistically to secure and implement a more robust mandate for UNMIS that will allow it to enforce demilitarized zones in the sensitive North-South border areas of Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile.

While Darfur and the CPA should be the top U.S. priorities in Sudan, this administration must also do a better job of anticipating conflicts in other marginalized regions, such as the Northern state where communities have been forcibly displaced to accommodate hydroelectric dam construction. The international community should also put pressure on the Sudanese government to better implement the 2006 Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement.

The Emphasis on Diplomatic Resources for the Pursuit of Peace:
The appointment of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, is a positive advancement in U.S. diplomacy efforts for Sudan. However, U.S. diplomacy still needs to be better coordinated with the international community, including European allies, Arab and African states, and other countries that hold key leverage over Sudan such as China. Economic pressure such as sanctions will not be effective in changing Khartoum’s behavior unless it is coordinated. The decline in U.S. international standing due to terrible foreign policy decisions over the past eight years has weakened U.S. ability to build effective multilateral coalitions.

The diplomatic rhetoric has become muddled recently as the classification of the violence in Darfur, in its current form, is being debated in the highest echelons of U.S. diplomatic circles. In June 2009, the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan remarked that there are only “remnants of genocide” remaining in the area; President Obama and the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice maintain that they, as well as the State Department, have retained the classification of the violence as genocide. The mass killings evident in 2003-2004 have abated somewhat, but there are still millions of Darfuris still affected by ongoing violence, as well as an unstable climate throughout Sudan that the U.S. should address comprehensively.

UNAMID Success and the U.S.:
The U.S. must do everything in its power to salvage success for UNAMID. The UNAMID mission still has less than its authorized force on the ground in Darfur, which weakens any of its efforts to maintain the peace. While it is true that some responsibility for the force’s exceedingly slow deployment rests with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, it is unfair for the UN’s most powerful member state to pass the blame to UN bureaucracy without doing more to solve the problem itself. The U.S. should continue to engage with the “Friends of UNAMID” working group to match troop-contributing countries (TCCs) with appropriate training and logistical support from donors. These support efforts should see TCCs through every stage of the deployment process.

The U.S. needs to ask our allies in the international community to do more to provide the helicopters and other vehicles and equipment that UNAMID lacks. U.S. financial support for UNAMID so far has been robust – President Bush authorized $100 million for the force. President Obama must ensure that this commitment continues and is matched with diplomatic pressure on the government of Sudan to stop obstructing the mission’s deployment and free operation. Even in a time of economic uncertainty at home, U.S. funding for UNAMID should not come at the expense of support for other peacekeeping missions in Africa and worldwide – or other foreign assistance programs.

Keeping the Promise to Protect:
Congress has shown a deep interest in Sudan, including passing the landmark Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act. However, it takes strong executive leadership to exercise the diplomacy and international pressure that the U.S. must use to effectively help bring peace to Darfur. President Obama has pledged to pursue peace and security for the people of Sudan with “unstinting resolve.” The American people must hold him to this task.

The U.S. must be a leader in supporting democratic institutions that protect against corruption and human rights abuses. Civil society organizations will play a key role in providing an open space for all citizens to participate in elections and peace processes.

Political Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC):
Introducing structures that address peace, justice and reconciliation through community models of restorative justice should be a priority for U.S.-Sudan relations. This should be designed with the goal of involving all communities affected by the conflict, and should find some common grounds between it and the ICC.

Even though the ICC arrest warrant of Bashir fell short of specifying genocide charges against Bashir, it adds momentum to the pressure that calls for an end to killings and displacement in Darfur. With this indictment, President Bashir becomes the first sitting head of state to be issued with an arrest warrant.

This commendable decision by the ICC will only be meaningful if the international community is able to pursue the indictment with concrete steps to ensure that Bashir is held accountable for the war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Chief Prosecutor for the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo has appealed the judges’ decision not to indict Bashir for genocide, aiming to ensure that Bashir is indicted for the appropriate charges regardless of the political climate.

The AU asked the U.N. Security Council for a delay in the indictment of Bashir, but was refused; AU member countries have therefore refused to help in his arrest. Failure by the international community to follow-up and enforce this indictment will severely undermine the ICC’s authority and engender a culture of impunity by other tyrants.

It is commendable that the U.S., alongside others in the international community, has come out in full support of the ICC’s decision. But rhetoric must evolve to action to stop the violence in Darfur. At present, over six years after the government of Sudan began its genocidal onslaught in Darfur, there is no political peace process for the region of which to speak of. The U.S. government should work with the UN Security Council and use the indictment as vital leverage on Khartoum.

Predictably, the Sudanese government reacted to the arrest warrant by targeting local and international humanitarian organizations working in Darfur. According to Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission, at least thirteen organizations were expelled and almost 40% of humanitarian workers left the country. Since then, the organizations have been slowly moving back into the area and the level of food supplies and services are back to what they had been prior to the expulsion of the humanitarian organizations. Millions of Darfuris depend on these humanitarian organizations for food, clothing, shelter, health and other basic needs.

As important as it is to condemn the expulsion of humanitarian organizations from Darfur, the point must be made clearly that the long-term solution to the crisis in Darfur is not the presence of humanitarian organizations. The killings and displacements must stop so that the people of Darfur have space to work for themselves and benefit from independent secure livelihoods. In the meantime, the government of Sudan must fulfill its sovereign responsibility to provide all the necessary socio-economic security to protect the people of Sudan, and also allow the unhindered full deployment of UN peacekeeping missions.

The new U.S. administration provides new opportunities for peace in Darfur. Shortly after the arrest warrant was issued, President Obama met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. He denounced the expulsion of humanitarian organizations, calling it ‘not acceptable.” Susan Rice, U.S. representative to the UN, said that the ‘reckless decisions’ by Bashir and his regime endangers millions of lives in Darfur. The administration must follow up these words with concrete actions to bring about peace.

 

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