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Africa Policy E-JournalEast Africa: Horn Conflict, 2 +++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++ Region: East Africa +++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Additional On-Line Sources Note: The Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List, with only two to three postings a week on a variety of subjects, cannot supply current news on breaking stories. We will, however, continued to provide occasional listings of other sources available on-line (such as those below) which provide more frequent updates for those interested in particular subjects. Newsflashes from Ethiopian Embassy in Washington Page with information from Eritrean Government Addis Tribune on-line edition Africa News Online The Washington Post Africa Page BBC News Africa CNN Africa Page
23 Jun 1998 Background to the Current Border Dispute Between Eritrea and Ethiopia From the Embassy of Eritrea, Washington, DC 1. The crisis between Eritrea and Ethiopia is rooted in the violation by the Government of Ethiopia of Eritrea's colonial boundaries, and to willfully claim, as well as physically occupy, large swathes of Eritrean territory in the southwestern, southern and southeastern parts of the country. This violation is made manifest in the official map issued in 1997 as well as the map of Ethiopia embossed in the new currency notes of the country that came into circulation in November 1997. 2. Ethiopia went further than laying claims on paper to create a de facto situation on the ground. The first forcible act of creating facts on the ground occurred in July 1997 when Ethiopia, under the pretext of fighting the Afar opposition, brought two battalions to Bada (Adi Murug) in southwestern Eritrea to occupy the village and dismantle the Eritrean administration there. This unexpected development was a cause of much concern to the Government of Eritrea. Eritrea's Head of State subsequently sent a letter to the Ethiopian Prime Minister on August 16, 1997, reminding him that "the forcible occupation of Adi Murug" was "truly saddening." He further urged him to "personally take the necessary prudent action so that the measure that has been taken will not trigger unnecessary conflict." A week later, on August 25, 1997, the Eritrean Head of State again wrote to the Prime Minister stressing that measures similar to those in Bada were taken in the Badme (southwestern Eritrea) area and suggesting that a Joint Commission be set up to help check further deterioration and create a mechanism to resolve the problem. 3. Unfortunately, Eritrean efforts to solve the problem amicably and bilaterally failed as the Government of Ethiopia continued to bring under its occupation the Eritrean territories that it had incorporated into its map. Our worst fears were to be realized when on May 6, 1998, on the eve of the second meeting of the Joint Border Commission, the Ethiopian army launched an unexpected attack on Eritrean armed patrols in the Badme area claiming that they had transgressed on areas that Ethiopia had newly brought under its control. This incident led to a series of clashes which, coupled with the hostile measures that were taken by the Government of Ethiopia, resulted in the present state of war between the two countries. 4. Ethiopia's unilateral re-drawing of the colonial boundary and flagrant acts of creating facts on the ground are the essential causes of the current crisis. In light of these facts, Ethiopia's claims that it is the victim of aggression are obviously false and meant to deceive the international community. Indeed, Ethiopia to this day occupied Eritrean territories in the Setit area in the southwestern part of the country. 5. Ethiopia's blatant act of aggression is clearly in violation of the OAU Charter and Resolution AHG/RES 16(1) of the First Assembly of the Heads of State and Government held in Cairo in 1964. Unless rectified without equivocation, Ethiopia's refusal to abide by the OAU Charter and decisions, and its continued occupation of undisputed Eritrean territory will open a Pandora's box and create a cycle of instability in the region. The acceptance of Ethiopia's logic will not only affect all African States but will indeed backfire against Ethiopia itself, since its sovereignty over much of its territory, including on the Ogaden, is based on the same principles of international law. 6. A simple border dispute has assumed this level of conflict because of Ethiopia's continued escalation of its hostile and provocative acts. Among these are: * the declaration of war by Ethiopia's Parliament on May 13, 1998; * the launching of an air-strike by Ethiopia on June 5, 1998, on Asmara; * the imposition of an air blockade and maritime access blockade to Eritrean ports through the threat of incessant and indiscriminate air bombing; * the mass expulsion and indiscriminate arrests of thousands of Eritreans from Ethiopia. In spite of all these, Eritrea has been restrained and committed to a peaceful solution of the dispute. In this vein, it has already presented constructive proposals (attached). The proposals center on: i) the demarcation of the entire boundary between the two countries on the basis of borders established by colonial treaties; ii) the demilitarization of the entire border area pending demarcation; and, iii) the establishment of appropriate ad hoc arrangements for civil administration in populated demilitarized areas in the interim period. In addition, considering the state of war that exists between the two countries, the Government of Eritrea has been calling--and continues to call--for: i) an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities; and, ii) the start of direct talks between the two parties in the presence of mediators. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Asmara, June 19, 1998 Attachment: Proposal for a Solution Submitted by the Government of Eritrea 1. PRINCIPLES The Government of Eritrea and the Government of Ethiopia agree that they will resolve the present crisis and any other dispute between them through peaceful and legal means. Both sides reject solutions that are imposed by force. Both sides agree to respect the clearly defined colonial boundaries between them. In this respect, both sides further agree that the actual demarcation of the borders will be carried out by a mutually acceptable technical team. In the event that there is some controversy on delineation, both sides agree to resolve the matter through an appropriate mechanism of arbitration. The demarcation of the borders shall be effected speedily and within an agreed time frame. Both sides agree to be bound by this agreement. 2. IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES 2.1 The UN Cartographic Unit, or any other body with the appropriate expertise, shall be charged with the task of demarcating the boundary in accordance with existing colonial border treaties. 2.2 The time frame for the demarcation of the boundary shall be six months. This time frame may be shortened or prolonged subject to justifiable technical reasons. This requisite time frame shall be designated as AN INTERIM PERIOD. 2.3 The demarcated boundary shall be accepted and adhered to by both sides. 2.4 If there are segments in the boundary whose delineation is under controversy, the matter shall be resolved through an appropriate mechanism of ARBITRATION. 2.5 The technical details relevant to the practical implementation of the DEMARCATION process shall be annexed to the agreement. 3. DEMILITARIZATION as a measure for defusing the crisis and expediting the demarcation of the borders so as to ensure a lasting solution shall be accepted and adhered to by both sides. 3.1 DEMILITARIZATION shall begin by the Mereb-Setit segment; proceed next to the Bada area and be implemented throughout the entire boundary in accordance with this phased pattern. 3.2 DEMILITARIZATION shall be implemented through the involvement and monitoring of observers. The team of observers shall be composed of the forces and commanders from the facilitators as well as representatives of both sides. 3.3 DEMILITARIZATION shall be completed within the time frame of one month. 3.4 The issue of civil administration in populated demilitarized areas shall be addressed through appropriate ad hoc arrangements that will be put in place for the interim period. 3.5 When the INTERIM period comes to an end following the completion of the demarcation of the entire boundary between the two countries, the LEGITIMATE AUTHORITIES shall regain full jurisdiction over their respective SOVEREIGN TERRITORIES. 3.6 The details regarding DEMILITARIZATION and its implementation modalities shall be included in the main agreement as an annex. 4.0 A full INVESTIGATION of the incident of May 6, 1998, shall be conducted in tandem with the demilitarization process. 5.0 This COMPREHENSIVE agreement, signed by both parties, shall be deposited in the UN and OAU as a legal agreement so as to ensure its binding nature.
Statement, on Security Council Resolution and Eritrea's Response ------- Yes, But From: Embassy of Ethiopia in Stockholm, Sweden http://www.ethemb.se/news.htm 30 June, 1998 It must have been very obvious to all those who have been following the crisis imposed on Ethiopia by the Eritrean authorities through their aggression, that Ethiopia's preferred option for resolving the crisis has been, and remains to be, the peaceful way. This, despite its prerogative under international law to exercise its legitimate right of self-defense. Ethiopia's unequivocal acceptance of the U.S-Rwanda proposal is a confirmation of this Ethiopian commitment to peace and its resolve to seeking a peaceful resolution of the military confrontation. Ethiopia's full and unreserved acceptance of the proposal by the facilitators should, in this context, be understood for what it really means. Ethiopia accepted the proposal not because it has no quarrel with everything contained in the proposal---a fact that can easily be overlooked---but because peace demanded that Ethiopia must do whatever is necessary, short of accepting that which would reward the aggressor and humiliate Ethiopia and its people. On Eritrea's part, its response to the peace initiative was negative from the outset. It refused to co-operate with the facilitators who happened to be mutual friends of the two countries and whose good offices were accepted by both, willingly and with no reservation. Eritrea refused the proposal by the facilitators for one reason only, because it failed to give blessing to Eritrea's illegal occupation through aggression of Ethiopian territory. Then came the decision of the 34th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU which unequivocally endorsed the proposal of the facilitators and appealed to Ethiopia and Eritrea to accept the proposal and implement it. True to form, the Eritrean reaction was negative and the Asmara authorities once again made it clear that peace was not their interest. It is under these circumstances and following Eritrea's rejection of the appeals of both the facilitators and of the OAU, at the highest level, that the United Nations Security Council was made to be seized with the crisis between Ethiopia and Eirtrea. There was virtually no stone unturned and no trick left unutilized by Eritrea----including pure and simple fabrication of stories and other diversionary tactics all unprecedented in the annals of diplomatic history-----to prevent the Security Council from being seized with the issue, most particularly to prevent the Council form coming out with a just verdict. But Eritrea failed to succeed and the Security Council did adopt a resolution on 26th of June, 1998, whose key elements gave endorsement to the OAU decision and , ispo facto , to the proposal by the facilitators. Ethiopia has accepted this resolution by the Security Council in its entirety, without picking and choosing and with no Ifs and Buts. On the other hand, Eritrea's response has been no more than gimmick. The Eritrean authorities have found it necessary this time around to conceal their lack of commitment to peace.They could not afford to be seen to always reject appeals for peace, all the more so because this time the appeal was being made by the Security Council. Accordingly, the Asmara authorities decided to let it be known that they would go along with the resolution of the Security Council,but---and this is the key----on the basis of a selective reading of the Council's decision and of picking bits and pieces from the resolution which is calculated to ignore its key elements. The international community, and the Security Council in particular, cannot, and we are confident will not, allow the Erirtean Authorities to get away with possibilities for prevaricating and for being disingenuous. They should be pinned down on whether or not they are prepared for a peaceful resolution of the crisis which hinges on their acceptance of the proposal which requires them to vacate Ethiopian territory that they have occupied through aggression.This is one of the key elements of the resolution by the Security Council and Eritrea cannot say yes to the decision by the Council, and then in the same breath pretend that it is not required by the same resolution to accept the proposal of the facilitators one of whose Key elements is Eritrea's withdrawal from Ethiopian territory. Eritrea should not be allowed to succeed in this attempt at fudging the issues involved which is transparently disingenuous.This again is a reflection of the underlying unwillingness of the Eritrean authorities to accept and implement the proposal of the facilitators which they know perfectly well is the only viable and realistic basis for avoiding that option which Ethiopia has refused resorting to because of its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Now that the Security Council has spoken in clear terms in support of the proposal already on the table, Eritrea should be denied all possibilities for creating confusion and should be required to implement the provisions of this important Security Council resolution without Ifs and Buts. On this depends whether or not the slim chance which might be available for a peaceful resolution of the crisis would be used properly. Here again, as it has always been since the beginning this crisis, the ball is in Eritrea's court. In this context, the international community has the responsibility of continuing to put pressure on the Eritrean regime to withdraw its troops from Ethiopian territory on the basis of the proposal made by the facilitators and endorsed by the OAU as well as now supported by the Security Council. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1st July, 1998
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