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Africa Policy E-Journalgiven the difficulty in maintaining up-to-date links in old files. However, we hope they may still provide leads for your research. Rwanda: Refugee Report, part 2 Date Distributed (ymd): 951109 The following are excerpts from the most recent report from the U.S. Committee for Refugees, based on visits to Rwanda and eastern Zaire in September and October. The full report is available from U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, # 701, Washington, DC 20036. Tel: (202) 347-3507; fax: (202) 347-3418. Site Visit Notes Rwandan Refugees: Updated Findings and Recommendations October 25, 1995 by Jeff Drumtra, U.S. Committee for Refugees ........ Part 2 Inside Rwanda * The number of refugees from each prefecture estimated. Estimates by UNHCR and the Rwandan government indicate that perhaps half of all Rwandan refugees originate from three prefectures: Kibungo, Byumba, and Gisenyi. Some 340,000 refugees originate from Kibungo prefecture, approximately 200,000 from Byumba, and 170,000 from Gisenyi. About 165,000 come from Ruhengeri prefecture, 160,000 from rural Kigali, and 160,000 from Butare region. An estimated 40,000 originate from Cyangugu prefecture, 40,000 from Gitarama region, 40,000 from Kibuye, 30,000 from Kigali town, and nearly 20,000 from Gikongoro, according to the estimates. These estimates are highly approximate, and account for only 1.3 million of the estimated 1.8 million refugees. * Land occupancy varies significantly in different regions of Rwanda. Population levels in several prefectures remain less than 50 percent of pre-genocide levels, according to Rwandan government data. Other prefectures have returned to nearly 100 percent of earlier population levels, according to the government. ... Population and refugee statistics suggest that Kibungo prefecture could be another potential flashpoint in the future. The Rwandan government has made Kibungo region a major permanent resettlement area for old caseload Tutsi returnees. Tutsi are gradually resettling in Kibungo even though some 340,000 Hutu--more than half the normal population--have not yet returned to their homes. * A tense war mentality continues to exist in Rwanda's border regions. Veteran troops of the RPA patrol border areas. Small-scale infiltrations by former Rwandan military (FAR) or Interahamwe militia occur several times weekly. Bases of FAR soldiers or militia exist inside Rwanda, in the Gishwati Forest of Gisenyi region, according to sources judged credible and impartial by USCR. Areas of infiltration appear to be particularly susceptible to overreactions and abuses by RPA troops on alert. Human rights violations in these border areas, regardless of perpetrators, shape refugees impressions about tensions and poor security in the rest of Rwanda. The pervasive presence of RPA troops in border areas--posted there for understandable security reasons--aggravates refugees concerns that they are unwelcome in Rwanda. < Recommendation #22 > Train RPA troops to receive large numbers of returnees. The government of Rwanda, with international assistance, should provide special training to RPA soldiers posted in border areas to prepare them to deal properly with large numbers of civilian returnees. Training should range from human rights to proper crowd control techniques. * Rwanda is a traumatized, post-genocide society that will likely remain traumatized for years or decades into the future. Rwanda's genocide continues to reverberate through Rwandan society. Fortunately for the world--but unfortunately for Rwanda--the world has only limited experience dealing with the legacy of genocide. As a traumatized society, Rwanda will likely experience revenge killings, violent land disputes, paranoia, and deep mistrust for years to come. Proper policies by the Rwandan government can alleviate the instability, but probably cannot eliminate it altogether. Similarly, proper repatriation programs can gradually make refugee return and resettlement possible, but ironclad guarantees of safety for absolutely all returnees are impossible. < Recommendation #23 > The U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) should remain prepared for a possible new round of humanitarian emergency in Rwanda. The relative calm inside Rwanda, coupled with OFDA s worldwide budget constraints, has virtually ended OFDA operations in the country. Significant repatriation could, however, propel Rwandan society into new stresses warranting quick OFDA reaction. Forcible expulsion of the refugees by Zaire would almost certainly trigger a humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, as would a massive voluntary return of refugees under the direction of FAR and the old regime. < Recommendation #24 > Continue training a national police force that would reduce the RPA's policing responsibilities. The RPA is trained as an army, not as a police force. Its continued involvement in domestic police work is a prescription for human rights problems and political concerns. International donors are making progress in helping Rwanda establish a police force. This should continue to be a priority in a country where post-genocide disputes over property, restitution, and ethnic tensions will be common for years. * Rwanda currently is sufficiently safe for refugee repatriation, according to UNHCR/Rwanda. UNHCR/Rwanda cites several criteria to explain its recent decision to encourage voluntary refugee repatriation to Rwanda. Until recent weeks UNHCR had facilitated repatriation to Rwanda but had stopped short of encouraging repatriation. UNHCR/Rwanda cites the Rwandan government's ongoing fidelity to the Arusha Accords; the Tripartitite Agreement on repatriation among UNHCR, Rwanda, and Zaire; gradual improvements in Rwanda's justice and prison systems; the recent pronouncement by the Rwandan president welcoming refugee return; and the Rwandan government's commitment to safe repatriation in order to gain favor with international donors. UNHCR officials cite a speech by Rwandan President Pasteur Bizimungu on Sept. 5 stating that the Rwandan government reiterates its determination to do everything possible to enable the return of Rwandan refugees. No efforts will be spared to ensure that every Rwandan enjoys equal rights to citizenship and protection by the government. Bizimungu pledged that the process of law will be followed under international law to ensure there are no arbitrary arrests. UNHCR staff and other observers point to the relatively safe return and resettlement of 13,000 refugees in August (who were forcibly expelled from Zaire) as another indication that conditions are sufficiently safe for larger repatriation. Up to 200 of the 13,000 returnees forcibly expelled from Zaire were arrested or detained in Rwanda, suggesting that 98 percent of the refugees resettled without serious incident. The RPA massacre of 110 Hutu at Kanama on September 11 has not changed the determination of UNHCR/Rwanda that most refugees can repatriate safely. UNHCR/Rwanda indicated to USCR that Rwandan authorities appear to be responding appropriately to the Kanama massacre. < Recommendation #25 > Conditions in much of Rwanda currently appear to be suitable for gradual voluntary repatriation. Rapid uncoordinated repatriation in large numbers, however, would probably be dangerous. UNHCR is correct to promote organized voluntary repatriation at this time. Systematic persecution of innocent returnees is not evident. Rwandan civil society, however, appears to have a limited capacity to absorb large numbers of returnees at this time. Future human rights incidents and other disputes are predictable as land becomes more occupied. Appropriate policies by the Rwandan government can alleviate these repatriation problems, but probably cannot eliminate them in a post-genocide society. < Recommendation #26 > Establish repatriation reception committees in each commune to deal with local problems related to repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration. Before significant repatriation begins, appropriate agencies should act now to establish local repatriation reception committees capable of dealing with problems related to repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration before they erupt into violence. The UN Human Rights Field Operation has recently taken a lead in organizing this endeavor, but much remains to be done. < Recommendation #27 > Provide improved analysis of the causes of human rights violations and how to resolve them. International donors should help the UN Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda improve its ability to provide more sophisticated analysis of the causes and solutions for human rights violations. Some 112 UN human rights field officers scattered through the country currently provide a wealth of raw data on human rights and security conditions. The program's analytical capacity is weak, however, and is therefore less useful than it could be. Proper computer mapping and staff support would enable human rights officials in the country to analyze whether security incidents occur more frequently in border areas than elsewhere; whether atrocities tend to occur immediately after infiltrations by FAR; whether abuses tend to occur immediately prior to RPA troop rotations; whether security incidents rise when local repatriation reaches a certain threshhold; whether atrocities decline when local schools open, etc. This type of correlative analysis creates opportunities for preventive actions. The Rwandan government, the UN, international donors, and assistance agencies all would benefit from the insights generated by this type of sophisticated, constructive analysis. < Recommendation #28 > Make safer the new border crossing between the Goma camps and the Gisenyi region, located at Mutovu. UNHCR and the Rwandan government have attempted to encourage refugee repatriation by opening a new border crossing at Mutovu, six kilometers from Zaire's Kibumbu refugee camp. USCR visited the crossing point. Fewer than 20 refugees had returned via the Mutovu crossing. One problem was that refugees wishing to cross at Mutovu could arrive there only after walking six kilometers through the bush, where they were vulnerable to potential ambush by Interahamwe, RPA, or bandits. In addition, RPA troops were reportedly threatening to limit the number of returnees to 150 per day and were threatening to shoot any returnees who strayed from the footpath. Roads from the border crossing to a reception center 10 miles away would be almost impassable for large vehicles in rainy season. UNHCR/Rwanda and UNHCR/Goma should collaborate to provide transportation or escorts for refugees wanting to repatriate via Mutovu crossing. UNHCR/Rwanda should improve the road to the border crossing. Rwandan authorities should ensure that no artificial limits are placed on the number of returnees at Mutovu and should instruct RPA troops that returnees are not targets of war. * The permanent resettlement of old caseload Tutsi returnees is proceeding slowly. The Rwandan government estimates that 750,000 old caseload Tutsi have returned to Rwanda. Approximately half of them are believed to inhabit towns, and half are believed to live in rural areas. The exact number of Tutsi returnees who have resettled permanently on their own land is unclear, but appears to be no more than 20 percent. This means that more than a half-million Tutsi returnees remain effectively internally displaced, not yet settled on land they can call their own. The government is attempting to resettle large numbers of Tutsi returnees in the extreme northeast (including in Akagera Park), in the Kibungo prefecture in southeast Rwanda, and in northwest Rwanda between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. The government and UNHCR offer different assessments of the sustainable population capacities in these areas. ... The Rwandan government's internal bureaucracies also appear to be slowing permanent resettlement. ... International agencies and donors who correctly value a multiparty government in Rwanda are encountering the inefficiencies and competing interests inherent in multiparty governance. < Recommendation #29 > Permanently resettle larger numbers of old caseload Tutsi returnees. The government of Rwanda should resolve its internal debates and act in a rapid, coordinated fashion to facilitate the permanent resettlement of old caseload Tutsi returnees. UNHCR should exhibit more willingness to install the infrastructure for resettlement at designated sites, in advance of families arrival. Resettlement of Tutsi returnees should be a priority. Resettling Tutsi returnees is crucial to encourage repatriation by Hutu refugees and to minimize land conflicts when they do return. Many Tutsi returnees appear to be resisting permanent resettlement, but many other Tutsi squatters appear to be eager to relocate to their own property and get on with their lives. * International donors have disbursed less than one-fourth of the $1 billion they have pledged to Rwanda. International donors have pledged $1.084 billion to Rwanda. Some $252 million has been disbursed by donors as of mid- September, according to a report by UNDP/Kigali and the Rwandan government. The United States has pledged $92.5 million--less than 10 percent of the total pledges to Rwanda by all donors. The United States has disbursed $68.5 million--about three- quarters of its pledged amount. * International donors have provided only 12 percent of the $205 million required for refugee resettlement. Some $205 million is required over two years for refugee resettlement, according to the Rwandan government and UNDP/Kigali. International donors have thus far pledged $82.2 million for this project and have disbursed only $25.5 million, according to the mid-September monthly report to donor governments. The report states that the Action Plan for refugee resettlement remains largely unfunded despite the fact that most donors have insisted on an orderly return of refugees from abroad as part of the overall reconciliation program.... At the same time, some $500 million [has] reportedly been channeled...to support refugees outside Rwanda. < Recommendation #30 > International donors should continue to accelerate their disbursement of pledged monies. Slow reaction has characterized the international community's response to Rwanda during the past two years. One key to Rwanda's refugee problem is to stabilize the situation inside Rwanda, yet international financial assistance has been painfully slow to arrive. A top official at the U.S. Agency for International Development noted in September that he has never witnessed a situation whereby the international community, for all intents and purposes, has marginalized a government to the extent it has in Rwanda. Only in recent months have donor disbursements accelerated. The current disbursement total is five times larger than in May, three times larger than in July. It is true that an infusion of too much money too quickly can create new problems, but that does not yet appear to be a problem in this case. The government of Rwanda suffers from a profound lack of capacity after the genocide and refugee flight, according to Randolph Kent, the UN's Humanitarian Coordinator in Kigali. International donors should honor the financial commitments they have made in a timely manner.
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Africa Policy E-Journal
