AFRICOM: The Militarization of U.S.-Africa Policy Revealed

February 6, 2008

On February 6, 2007 the Bush Administration announced its plans to establish a unified U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). One year later, the U.S. continues to hurtle full speed ahead with the launch of President Bush’s still ill-defined program, despite grave concerns raised by African leaders and civil society. Coupled with the current trend of U.S. foreign policy towards Africa that is driven exclusively by U.S. energy and security interests, without regard to the needs and concerns of the vast majority of the people of Africa, this initiative will leave an entrenched military footprint on the continent. Objections have been raised from Africans and Americans committed to democracy, human rights, justice and peace in Africa that are alarmed by the projected structure that would place humanitarian work under the auspices of the Department of Defense.

The development of AFRICOM comes within the context of a dramatic build up in U.S. military activity in Africa since 2002. The total amount of U.S. military sales, financing and training expenditures for eight African countries considered particularly strategic of the “war on terror” has increased from about $40 million between 1997 and 2001 to over $130 million between 2002 and 2006.

In October 2003, James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner, both from the conservative think-tank the Heritage Foundation, proposed to the Bush administration the creation of a centralized Africa command for the U.S. military. The Carafano/Gardiner proposal makes clear that the objective is to preserve U.S. access to African oil and other natural resources on the continent. The Heritage report also points to the strategic importance of Africa in the global “war on terror.” Their proposal resonated with the Bush administration, and AFRICOM began initial operations in October 2007 with temporary headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. But much like 150 years ago when Western countries argued that their real goals in Africa were to bring liberty and democratic ideals to the continent, the Bush Administration has been trying to convince skeptical audiences in Africa and elsewhere that AFRICOM is ultimately driven by altruistic motives. While AFRICOM appears to be a done deal, with $75.5 million budgeted for operations in FY2008 and a presidential budget request of $389 million for FY2009, the public explanations and justifications for it can only be described as seriously confusing if not downright evasive.

The projected structure of AFRICOM would place humanitarian work previously done by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under the Department of Defense (DOD) directive. To U.S. and African civil society groups, and even to U.S. Congressional critics of AFRICOM, the Administration has argued that the State Department will remain responsible for diplomacy and development while AFRICOM will “support” USAID and other humanitarian organizations in the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance. The Administration suggests there will be more civilian oversight of AFRICOM than any other Military Command. Yet it remains hard to see how African policy will not be driven by military engagement as opposed to a genuine partnership if the State Department and USAID are positioned under DOD in AFRICOM.

Military commands are simply not designed to do humanitarian work, and for commissioned officers and DOD, humanitarian work will never trump military objectives. This reality was clearly illustrated in Iraq when the State Department and humanitarian groups were simply cut out of planning discussions around the build up to the invasion and its aftermath. AFRICOM appears likely to follow a similar trajectory.

African governments are told that AFRICOM is simply a restructuring of African programs currently split amongst the existing U.S. global military units of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM.) General William Ward, the designated commander of AFRICOM, made the case for AFRICOM at a meeting with African Union (AU) leaders in Addis Ababa in early November 2007, arguing that the U.S. has a national interest in helping to “stabilize” Africa. “We come and do things to assist our African partners in increasing their capacity, their capability to provide a stable environment here in Africa.” When asked whether AFRICOM was “simply a militarization of the continent?” he replied, “Absolutely false; not the case.” His answer is, of course, contradicted by the very reality of the increasing militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa over the last five years.

AFRICOM is being touted in Private Military Contractor (PMC) industry publications like Soldier of Fortune as ushering in a bountiful new market for employment. In Iraq, PMCs hired by the U.S. government were accountable to no one, resulting in unacceptable human rights violations. It is reasonable to be concerned that PMCs brought in under AFRICOM will follow a similar pattern.

African voices from civil society and from democratically elected African governments should be honored in decisions relating to the location of AFRICOM and its role in Africa. Thus far, only Liberia has given any public support for this initiative. Other nations and regional bodies including the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have expressed deep concern about a deepened U.S. military presence on African soil.

Africa Action invites U.S.-Africa advocates to stand in solidarity with African civil society voices on the continent by challenging not only the existence of AFRICOM but seeking several important changes to the proposed program. AFRICOM should decouple the U.S. Department of State and USAID from DOD to ensure that U.S.-Africa policy will be driven by diplomacy, development and genuine partnership, not military engagement. Clear lines of accountability and mechanisms for transparency must be established not only for AFRICOM but also for any PMCs employed by the U.S. in Africa to ensure the protection of the rule of law, democracy and human rights on the continent. Funding for AFRICOM and the increasing militarization of aid and engagement in Africa should be re-allocated to serve a comprehensive agenda that promotes just security by supporting sustainable development, deeper debt cancellation for impoverished countries in Africa, and fully funding the fight against HIV/AIDS and other health challenges on the continent.

AFRICOM raises more questions then it is able to answer at this point in its development. Who does the United States intend to stabilize by introducing more military equipment and approving more arms sales into the region? How does the U.S. decide when to use force in “stabilizing” a conflict? If people are protesting unfair corporate practices near the grounds of an oil company, will the U.S. use force, or encourage the use of force by African military units, to protect these corporate assets? Will U.S. soldiers be accountable in any way to African governments or their citizens? To what degree will the U.S. employ PMCs in Africa? Will U.S. economic interests trump the rule of law, democracy and accountability in Africa? The answers to the questions above will go a long way to determine whether AFRICOM constitutes a solution to a bureaucratic challenge of a region divided between other global military commands or is actually likely to encourage future conflicts. One thing is clear. The Bush Administration’s fixation on security and the “war on terror” will escalate the militarization of U.S. policy in Africa in 2008 with the launching of AFRICOM.

More Reading on AFRICOM

African Voices on AFRICOM, February 2008
http://www.africaaction.org/resources/page.php?op=read&documentid=2826&type=6

Africa Action’s 2008 Africa Policy Outlook, February 2008
http://www.africaaction.org/resources/docs/AfricaPolicyOutlook20082.pdf

resistAFRICOM.org – a project of The Hip Hop Caucus, Africa Faith and Justice Network, Africa Action, TransAfrica Forum, Foreign Policy in Focus and the Institute for Policy Studies. A joint backgrounder answering frequently asked questions about AFRICOM is available here:
http://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/1552/t/5734/content.jsp?content_KEY=3855