The world’s biggest sporting event was this year also marketed as an occasion of momentous social progress. Between seas of waving flags and glimpses of the majestic Table Mountain, World Cup viewers were beset by a heavy-handed message of impending change in Africa. The theme of “Africa’s time” having arrived was repeated in FIFA’s official television lead-in, the lyrics of Shakira’s hit theme, and former president Thabo Mbeki’s assertion that the World Cup would represent the “moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict.”

These kind of statements play into a familiar paradigm in which the marginalization of Africa from the global order is reduced to behavioral and psychological factors: a lack of resolve, “Afro-pessimism,” tolerance of continued corruption and under-development. From this perspective, the fact that South Africa has successfully hosted soccer’s premiere event seems to represent a significant victory, and FIFA’s decision to hold the cup in South Africa seems a veritable blessing for the region’s development.

However, this is essentially the same model of private sector-led growth—albeit with a nationalist spin—that has dominated mainstream African development discourse since the introduction of structural adjustment programs. Heavy investments in the development of business and tourism infrastructure have been justified as leading to growth and, over time, decreased poverty. The inherent assumption that growth will “trickle down” fails to take into account the continued lack of access to the formal economy and the profound social separation that is the legacy of apartheid for many in South Africa. Much of the money made during the World Cup will leave the country with corporate sponsors or remain concentrated in the hands of large food service and hotel operators, and most of the investments made in advance of the cup will benefit already well-serviced parts of cities inhabited by wealthier South Africans.

The bulk of the 33 billion rand, or about $4.3 billion, spent by the South African government was directed towards infrastructure specific to the World Cup or the tourism industry. The largest portion, an estimated 20 billion rand, was spent on upgrading international airports in major cities. Eight billion rand spent on stadiums was the most controversial expense, with a brand new stadium built in Cape Town to avoid use of an existing one in a poor township. UBS Investment Research estimates that the World Cup created roughly 330,000 jobs, but most of these were low-paid and ended at the close of the event.
And what of the money brought into South Africa by tourism and other cup-related activities? FIFA brought in over $3 billion in profits, on which it is not obligated to pay taxes. An initial estimate from government has South African revenues at 93 billion rand, or roughly $13 billion. The winners here are clear—South African advertising agencies’ profits increased by $200 million in 2010, and large hotels which could meet a number of FIFA requirements enjoyed full occupancy. Meanwhile, smaller B&B owners went into debt after they had taken out loans to upgrade their properties only to be excluded from the list of recommended accommodations.

For many communities, the experience of the World Cup was one not only of exclusion but of active harassment. Following the eviction of informal settlement-dwellers from areas in Cape Town near the new stadium, members of the Poor Peoples’ Alliance decided to organize a “Poor Peoples’ World Cup.” This cup featured 38 teams from about 15 poor communities in the Cape Town area and gave participants and spectators with neither money for match tickets nor electricity to watch the matches a chance to participate in the festivities.

With tourists generally confined to white areas of Cape Town, the Poor Peoples’ World Cup also sought to bring attention to the vast inequality in South Africa while the dominant media narrative focused on the country’s beauty. Cup organizers were deeply critical of the expenditures leading up to the World Cup and the increase in South Africa’s foreign debt in order to pay for FIFA-mandated improvements. “At the end of the day, what did we benefit?” asks Pamela Beukes, secretary of the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and one of the cup’s organizers. “In order to pay back the loans that our country has taken, we’re going to see cuts in services.”

To deem the World Cup a "success" uncritically affirms an approach to development centered on the courting of short-term influxes of capital and embrace of highly unequal public-private “partnerships.” The Poor Peoples’ World Cup, by contrast, has sought to highlight the overwhelming need for adequate housing, education, and jobs and skills training as the priorities for state spending. At stake in the post-World Cup analysis, then, is whether the former path will be legitimated in the eyes of the South African and international publics and corporate-controlled mega-events like the World Cup accepted as tools for growth and development.

Rebecca Burns, Master's student in Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, and currently living and researching in Cape Town, South Africa.
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