Beyond our concerns about the militarization of U.S.-Africa policy, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has given us more reasons to be critical of AFRICOM. Last month, the GAO released a report entitled “Improved Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa.” The title may be fairly innocuous, but the evidence contained within its pages signals an inability by AFRICOM officials to lead an effective military command.

In its first critique, the report states “activities are being implemented as the detailed supporting plans for conducting many activities have not yet been finalized.” In other words, AFRICOM is engaging in military programs before knowing exactly how they will be carried out. According to a diagram in the report, the larger vision and strategy plans have been finished, but none of the regional engagement plans or contingency plans have been finished. Only one of the supporting plans has been finalized. It begs the question: how exactly is AFRICOM providing guns and training without knowing how they will be used?

Equally as concerning is the section that indicates, “in addition to unfinished strategic plans, AFRICOM is generally not measuring the long-term effects of its activities.” It notes that very few project proposals include information about objectives or anticipated outcomes and that some activities may have unintended consequences. This is due in part to the lack of plans, but also to the lack of effective sociocultural training and consultation with other U.S. agencies. For example, “embassy officials cited a past example where the task force had proposed drilling a well without considering how its placement could cause conflict in clan relationships or affect pastoral routes.” Embassies have also expressed concern over the military doing research on cultural sensitivities, suggesting instead that this information be gathered by interagency partners not in uniform (USAID, for example).

Near the top of our list of reasons why we reject the U.S. military’s expanding role in Africa is the inevitable conflict between embassy civilians and military generals. We have always argued that although AFRICOM says ambassadors retain Chief of Mission authority in their countries, they are put in a difficult position when a four-star general walks into their office and asks permission to conduct a training exercise. Of course they’re going to agree. The GAO report provides proof of this challenge:

“[A senior State official] cited a recent example in which the U.S. ambassador to Liberia maintained that the embassy should have authority over DOD personnel carrying out security sector reform activities in the country, while AFRICOM argued that it needed shared authority over these personnel. A shared authority agreement was eventually reached for DOD personnel who would reside in Liberia on a semipermanent basis.” (p. 38)

Other parts of the report indicate that, as we suspected, AFRICOM really does have more money than it knows what to do with. Air Force officials said, “from their perspective, no individual at AFRICOM or its Air Force component command has comprehensive knowledge of all funding sources for activities.” On a similar note, questions are also raised about the ability of low-income countries to sustain military programs once U.S.-funded security assistance projects are finished.

In each section, the report is careful to highlight progress that has been made in terms of interagency collaboration, but the questions it raises far outweigh such cursory praise. It is clear that AFRICOM is not only detrimental to U.S.-Africa relations but that it is also an uncoordinated disaster. Building schools and forgetting about them, not mandating cultural awareness training, not knowing how to get funding for conference participants, and going directly to the Djibouti government without involving the embassy are all examples of how poorly AFRICOM is doing in terms of implementation.

Considering this evidence, Congress should reject the administration’s request for funding for AFRICOM and all military operations in Africa in the next round of budget requests. Even if they are unable to see the long-term ramifications of DOD’s actions on the continent, at least they can read GAO’s scathing review of AFRICOM’s capabilities.

Beth Tuckey
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A month before twin suicide bombs exploded in Kampala, Uganda on July 11th, and before the Somali-based militant group al-Shabaab openly confessed responsibility for the terrorist attacks (Islamists claim attack in Uganda) the New York Times wrote an investigative report about child soldiers in Somalia working for a military that is armed and financed by the United States as part of a counter-terrorism strategy in the Horn of Africa (Children carry guns for US ally, Somalia). The African Union Summit, currently underway in Kampala this week, is serving as a culminating platform for U.S. diplomats, security generals and special envoys to voice their support for the African Union’s decision to increase their military efforts in fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia as part of the larger battle to incriminate terrorist actions across the globe (Briefing on African Union Summit, US department of State). However, America’s full-fledged military support for these new initiatives only serves to increase violence in the already anarchistic region and fails to recognize how aptly blind U.S. foreign policy has been toward Somalia since 1991.

In deciding to remove the blinders from their diplomatic eyes, the Obama Administration voices its support for an active engagement with African leaders in peacekeeping efforts throughout East Africa, while denouncing the terrorist vigilantes instigated by al-Shabaab radicals. However, what the U.S. fails to recognize is that American policy of negligence in a region that has been classified as “stateless” for the last 20 years, is suddenly deserving of our attention only now when it serves our “seek-and-destroy” national security objectives. Furthermore, nowhere in this doctrine of instructive diplomacy does President Obama or anyone else in the Department of States reiterate the necessity of political stability in the region. Political stability is a prerequisite to quell social instability, including actions of militant fringe groups. Not one newspaper article or Department of State press release recognizes this monstrous elephant in the room: Somalia does not have a legitimate centralized government, and therefore, without a centralized federal structure, whom is the U.S. actually extending its support?  

One way that the U.S. can authenticate its rhetoric is by recognizing the legitimacy of the northwest region of Somalia that does have political stability: the sovereign territory of Somaliland. Secondly, the U.S. should concentrate some of its military efforts on relieving the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Somalia – the deplorable socioeconomic welfare of the “country’s” citizens has increased exponentially since the nation’s collapse 20 years prior. The current government in Somalia lacks the ability to protect the interests of its people, and the people recognize its inept ability to legitimately provide the services and protection they need as citizens. By increasing U.S. funded humanitarian aid to the region, international leaders can also hope to reduce the desperate circumstances people find themselves under on a daily basis in Somalia. In doing so, recruitment by extremist groups sympathizing with their plight may be reduced as the citizens see they have different options to improve their lives that do not involve joining a terrorist organization.

Overall, the United States has been given a crucial opportunity to amend 20 years of discrepant foreign policy in the Horn of Africa. The recent terrorist bombings in Uganda can serve to strengthen relations between US Department of State and African government leaders, while also increasing the legitimacy of African multinational institutions, like the African Union, by providing an avenue for African governments to mobilize collectively and interact with the Obama Administration in a manner that is equitable and mutually beneficial. Overall, African leaders should take the lead in drafting the new policy toward Somalia, with an emphasis on shifting the mindset of ordinary Somalis away from a deterministic outlook where young men think groups like al-Shabaab provide the only outlet to escape their suffering. Instead, let the United States coerce them not with guns and military prowess, but with “carrots of development” through support for political stability that can end 20 years of humanitarian crises in a country that deserves long-term support from the entire international community.

Kathryn Staples
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