Beyond our concerns about the militarization of U.S.-Africa policy, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has given us more reasons to be critical of AFRICOM. Last month, the GAO released a report entitled “Improved Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD’s Efforts in Africa.” The title may be fairly innocuous, but the evidence contained within its pages signals an inability by AFRICOM officials to lead an effective military command.

In its first critique, the report states “activities are being implemented as the detailed supporting plans for conducting many activities have not yet been finalized.” In other words, AFRICOM is engaging in military programs before knowing exactly how they will be carried out. According to a diagram in the report, the larger vision and strategy plans have been finished, but none of the regional engagement plans or contingency plans have been finished. Only one of the supporting plans has been finalized. It begs the question: how exactly is AFRICOM providing guns and training without knowing how they will be used?

Equally as concerning is the section that indicates, “in addition to unfinished strategic plans, AFRICOM is generally not measuring the long-term effects of its activities.” It notes that very few project proposals include information about objectives or anticipated outcomes and that some activities may have unintended consequences. This is due in part to the lack of plans, but also to the lack of effective sociocultural training and consultation with other U.S. agencies. For example, “embassy officials cited a past example where the task force had proposed drilling a well without considering how its placement could cause conflict in clan relationships or affect pastoral routes.” Embassies have also expressed concern over the military doing research on cultural sensitivities, suggesting instead that this information be gathered by interagency partners not in uniform (USAID, for example).

Near the top of our list of reasons why we reject the U.S. military’s expanding role in Africa is the inevitable conflict between embassy civilians and military generals. We have always argued that although AFRICOM says ambassadors retain Chief of Mission authority in their countries, they are put in a difficult position when a four-star general walks into their office and asks permission to conduct a training exercise. Of course they’re going to agree. The GAO report provides proof of this challenge:

“[A senior State official] cited a recent example in which the U.S. ambassador to Liberia maintained that the embassy should have authority over DOD personnel carrying out security sector reform activities in the country, while AFRICOM argued that it needed shared authority over these personnel. A shared authority agreement was eventually reached for DOD personnel who would reside in Liberia on a semipermanent basis.” (p. 38)

Other parts of the report indicate that, as we suspected, AFRICOM really does have more money than it knows what to do with. Air Force officials said, “from their perspective, no individual at AFRICOM or its Air Force component command has comprehensive knowledge of all funding sources for activities.” On a similar note, questions are also raised about the ability of low-income countries to sustain military programs once U.S.-funded security assistance projects are finished.

In each section, the report is careful to highlight progress that has been made in terms of interagency collaboration, but the questions it raises far outweigh such cursory praise. It is clear that AFRICOM is not only detrimental to U.S.-Africa relations but that it is also an uncoordinated disaster. Building schools and forgetting about them, not mandating cultural awareness training, not knowing how to get funding for conference participants, and going directly to the Djibouti government without involving the embassy are all examples of how poorly AFRICOM is doing in terms of implementation.

Considering this evidence, Congress should reject the administration’s request for funding for AFRICOM and all military operations in Africa in the next round of budget requests. Even if they are unable to see the long-term ramifications of DOD’s actions on the continent, at least they can read GAO’s scathing review of AFRICOM’s capabilities.

Beth Tuckey
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